
Everybody else in the world seems to have had their say about Richard Dawkin's most recent book. So, having now read it, I'm going to have my tuppence worth. If you want a more detailed and systematic review of it from a Christian perspective (but including scathing critiques from many atheists as well) read Alister McGrath's The Dawkins Delusion.
The book is, in many ways, a collection of ideas arranged for polemic affect rather than a single continuous argument. I am not going to attempt a comprehensive summary but rather lick up a few things that seemed to me particularly problematic.
Dawkins starts, and ends, with a conviction that the majesty of the scientific view of the universe is more inspiring and awesome than the religious view:
He quotes approvingly from Carl Sagan: "A religion, old or new, that stressed the magnificence of the universe as revealed by modern science might be able to draw forth reserves of reverence and awe hardly tapped by the conventional faiths."
Apart from the obvious complaint that it's not really reasonable to expect an old religion to display an understanding of the contemporary scientific view of the scale of the universe it appears that Dawkins is ignorant of Psalm 19, where the writer of 3,000 years ago specifically explores the vastness of the universe and the smallness, physically speaking, of humankind's place in it. It's also worth noting that as one walks around secular nations like Britain with its vast majority of irreligious people they are characterised not by reverence and awe for the universe. Instead the preoccupations of a society in which matter and this life are all that count are reality TV, mobile telephones and more and better homes, care and electronic gadgets. Dawkins' is badly mistaken about the practical results of secular materialism.
Dawkins frequently verges on the apoplectic about the special protection he sees as being given to religion and religious views. I agree with him that sometimes religious people and their beliefs are wrongly privileged. But for him to suggest that his vilification by some because you're "not allowed to say these things" about religion is a mark of the oppressiveness of religion itself as an idea is, frankly, ridiculous. No doubt some, even many, religious people enforce their religious laws to the point of questioning anybody's freedom to believe differently. But almost every atheist state that has arisen has also been profoundly intolerant of people expressing religious views. How is this any different?
Dawkins makes much of a treaty that states that "the Government of the United States is not, in any sense, founded on the Christian religion." and the fact that, at the time, in 1797 it caused no dissent. One can't help wondering how many of the population of the United States were actually aware in 1797 of the wording of a treaty with Tripoli! That aside Dawkins never stops to ask the question whether, historically, and whatever the founding fathers may have thought, the constitution of the USA would have been possible without the influence of Christian thinkers. One suspects not. Finally since Dawkins insists that he is guided only by evidence, in the narrow scientific sense, it would make no difference to his acceptance of the Christian faith if everybody else in the world believed it. So why should it make any difference in the other direction whether the founding fathers were, or were not, Christians, theists, deists, agnostics or atheists?
Overall perhaps the worst aspect of The God Delusion is Dawkins' blindness towards his own motivations (his perception of himself as a sort of neutral observer of the evidence rather than someone with an agenda - something he castigates the gospel writers for being) and his lack of charity (which, presumably, as an atheist Dawkins doesn't believe in anyway) towards the motivations of other people. Anyone who professes religious beliefs but not in a blood thirsty way is dishonest or inconsistent. Scientists who think there may be limits to the questions that can be asked by the scientific method are spineless or throwing sops to the religious. Poor Stephen Jay Gould, now dead, did not, we are told, actually mean most of the things he wrote in one of his most significant works on science and religion. One is not sure how Dawkins knows this - perhaps he has acquired divine powers?
When it comes to the evidence for religion Dawkins, rightly, heaps ridicule on the Templeton Foundation's "scientific" experiment to see whether prayer for the sick works. But he approves the general idea - that such things ought to be testable in a double blind type trial. But what if it is precisely something about the process of eliminating personality and relationship from the equation that is significant in the results? The understanding of most people of most faiths is that prayer is something that occurs in the context of a series of relationships with family, friends and members of a religious community as well as with their god. Dawkins is blinded to these important aspects precisely because of his demand that "proof" of religion conform to his methodology.
Dawkins is scathing of people who claim things to be true without evidence. But he himself does this all the time. To take just one example he extrapolates from the fact that we have now found 170 planets in the universe that, given the vast number that must be undiscovered, "there are very probably alien civilisations that are superhuman, to the point of being god-like in ways that exceed anything a theologian could possibly imagine." Apart from the fact that he offers no statistical evidence to back this up there is the problem that Christian theologians believe God to be eternal, infinite, all powerful, personal and all knowing - so it's hard to see how aliens, however sophisticated, could really exceed that. It's just another example of Dawkins consistent language to big up (some) scientists (basically him and those who agree with him) and belittle everyone else.
One cannot help wondering whether Dawkins is deliberately or accidentally ignorant about some things. He tells us that "If there is a logical argument linking the existence of great art to the existence of God, it is not spelled out by its proponents." Clearly he has never read G K Chesterton or C S Lewis on this topic; or he finds it inconvenient to deal with what they have written or he considers it so ridiculous as to be not worth bothering with - which would be strange as Dawkins appears to have made a habit of collecting all the most ridiculous things religious people have ever said and presenting them as normative and mainstream. That's not to deny that there are a lot of silly religious people out there. But there are a lot of silly atheists too!
Dawkins also attempts to undermine C S Lewis' trilemma (that Jesus was mad, bad or God) by telling us that there is a fourth possibility - that Jesus was honestly mistaken. This makes one wonder if Dawkins has actually done C S Lewis the courtesy of reading his formulation of the trilemma before arguing with it! The idea that Jesus was "honestly mistaken" is precisely Lewis' "mad" argument. To be honestly mistaken that you are the king of Israel, the one with unique relationship with the God of the universe, the one with power to forgive sin and the final judge of the world IS to be mad!
From the evidence, or not, for the existence of God Dawkins moves on to questions of morality. He says that "modern morality, wherever else it comes from, does not come from the Bible." He then tries to show that the God of the Old Testament is nasty and vindictive. Unfortunately, of the Old Testament quotations that Dawkins looks at (about, for example rape, murder and incest), precisely the point of most of them is that God views these actions as wicked and worthy of punishment. Christians, along with Dawkins, would want to say that not every incident recorded in the Bible is meant to be an ethical model for us. But that does not entail the false conclusion that he draws that modern morality does not come at all from the Bible - unless Dawkins wishes to deny that, for example, our cultural and/or legal taboos against murder, rape, adultery and the idea of treating others as you would treat yourself are not significantly influenced by the heritage of the Bible in our culture.
He quotes with approval the idea that, with or without religion you would still have "good people doing good things and evil people doing evil things". But he never articulates on what basis does Dawkins believe that there are, basically, "good" or "evil" people? And his use of Pascal's quote: "men never do evil so completely and cheerfully as when they do it from religious conviction" shows a profound ignorance of the history of 20th century atheism.
Dawkins tells us that religion is the means by which labels are attached to people in order to justify persecuting them or making them suffer in particular ways. Whilst he says he will not "guarantee" that this is always the case he pretty much hints that it usually is. But what about, for example, the Hutu and Tutsi tribes in Rwanda and Burundi? Or the Catholic French and the Catholic Italians in World War II? Or the Iranians and the Iraqis? Surely Dawkins cannot be ignorant of these conflicts? I suspect that they are conveniently laid aside because they do not neatly fit his hypothesis.
There are some, limited, attempts, to set out what ethics without God might look like. However in quoting Peter Singer as a most "eloquent advocate of the view that we should move on to a post-speciesist condition in which humane treatment is meted out to all species that have the brain-power to appreciate it." Dawkins omits to mention that Singer includes disabled newborn human babies amongst those who do not have the brain power to appreciate humane treatment and can thus legitimately be killed. Perhaps Dawkins did not think that promoting these views would add to the perceived moral integrity of atheists.
Dawkins wants us to be clear that it is Marxism rather than atheism that led Stalin to his wickedness: "Individual atheists may do evil things but they don't do evil thing in the name of Atheism." He never mentions that the whole materialist Marxist project was an exercise in practical atheism and that the terrible suffering of individuals that Stalin brought about was made possible by a evolutionary world view that said that the good of the collective nation, race and species was what mattered rather than the individual person with dignity as a bearer of God's image.
On the 9/11 bombings Dawkins quotes with approval those who blame "religion itself" for the attacks. But this is to fall into exactly the same trap that he goes to such lengths to avoid doing with Stalin and atheism.
Just because some religious people do wicked things doesn't make "religion" evil any more than the fact that some atheists do evil things makes atheism evil. This is particularly so because "religion" is, in most respects, a much broader category than atheist embracing all sorts of cultures, ideas and behaviours.
Dawkins asks how the 9/11 bombers can be perverting the "true" faith of Islam (as moderate Islamic leaders claim) when "faith, lacking objective justification, doesn't have any demonstrable standard to pervert?" This is another example of Dawkins prioritising his "demonstrable standard" over any others. It is arguable whether or not the Koran does, in fact, encourage martyrdoms and murders like the 9/11 attacks. But there is a standard, the teaching of the Koran, to which justification can be made; it just happens not to be a "scientific" standard on Dawkin's terms.
Exactly the same criticism can be levelled at Dawkins' own views on moral issues. What is the "demonstrable standard" of ethics for the atheist? This is particularly pertinent given that just a few pages earlier in the book Dawkins has listed someone's personal 10 commandments and then added a few suggestions of his own for improvement/alteration. But, as Dawkins himself hints, who is to decide to privilege one personal 10 commandments over another?
Towards the end of his book Dawkins is scathing about teaching the idea of hell to children and describes this as mental abuse. To be sure some of the things he describes religious people as doing to explain the idea of hell are very unpleasant and I wouldn't want to condone them. But is one to presume that Dawkins is against telling children that when they die that's it? That death is the end of life and individuality and they are no more? It seems not from the way he eulogises the bracing consolation of "facing straight into the strong, keen wind of understanding" - that is, in other words "when you die you rot." I recall as a child and teenager being profoundly disturbed and frightened by the thought of death and extinction as a person. Was it, therefore, mental abuse for the people who taught me that to do so? I suspect, though I cannot prove it, that Dawkins would say it was not. Why not? Because, again I speculate, it is true. Which returns Dawkins to the same place as the Christian; it is fine to teach children about frightening things like war, murder, death and hell - if they are true. So it is truth not, as Dawkins says, fear inducing qualities, that must be the arbiter.
In conclusion Dawkins finishes by talking about the beauty of the universe in its simple existence. The sharp eyes will noticed how, to enhance the beauty of the picture, the possibility of it being commonplace on many planets (emphasised earlier in the book when it suited his purposes in attacking the anthropic principle) is played down: "On one planet, and possibly only one planet in the entire universe, molecules.. Gather themselves together into… matter of such staggering complexity that they are capable of… falling in love with yet other chunks of complex matter."
The sentence sums up the book. It selectively ignores what has been said before and it is, ultimately, vacuous - why should any of this be amazing if it is, in the end, nothing other than the product of a universe whose laws and basis are nothing other than blind, random, pitiless indifference?